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Since its independence, Indonesia has experience a rapid and uneven economic growth. The financial 
crisis in 1998 has led Indonesia to decentralisation with a new political and government budget order 
in 2001. Researches found that the local government’s main expenditure are on routine spending, such 
as wage and asset maintenance, not on the development spending. 
Using macroeconomic data from 1993 to 2005, this paper aims to overview the inequality in Indonesia 
regions before and after the decentralisation. The paper deploy a set of data on inter government fiscal 
transfer, expenditure rate, and the level of revenue as a proxy variables to understand the effect to 
inequality. In this paper we will overview the level of disparities by using various methods and also the 
shifts of regional inequality over time. It is suggested that inequality level is still severe and 
convergence rate has decrease throughout the decentralisation era. Impacts from inequality can be 
detected although weak and fluctuated over time. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the 1970s there has been strong wave towards decentralisation among countries, 
both developing and developed economics. Besides political and administration shift, fiscal 
decentralisation is seen as a tool to achieve efficient resources allocation and promote 
development objectives (Seymour et al, 2002). Furthermore, fiscal decentralisation is 
considered to ‘escape the traps of inefficient governance, macroeconomic instability, and 
inadequate economic growth in which they have become mired in recent years’ (Seymour et 
al, 2002). Other supporters argues that fiscal decentralisation enables local governments in a 
better position to understand and provide better public services and goods that merit local 
needs. In addition, with decentralisation, local government are more closely to its people so 
they may have greater drive to practice better fiscal responsibilities in terms of general public 
service (Lin et al, 2000). Globally, decentralisation has been seen as a new insight with 
numerous studies on intergovernmental fiscal. Following its politic era shifts in 1998, 
Indonesia begins decentralisation era with two important Law of decentralisation, Law 
22/1999 and Law 25/1999. Law 22/1999 contains the administration of decentralisation 
arrangement between the central, provincial, municipality/regency, and village government. 
Meanwhile Law 25/1999 details the fiscal decentralisation between government levels. 
However, in Indonesia administration as well as fiscal decentralisation has been critique 
that it may increase disparities that has been occurred in Indonesia since years. Looking at the 
fiscal share, the central government continues to dominate Indonesia’s public finance through 
its domination in income tax, oil and gas tax and value added tax. Despite many empirical 
studies have been conducted on the both Law, there has been lack of studies on the 
association between fiscal decentralisation and regional disparities for developing countries in 
general and Indonesia in particular. This research overviews the relationship between fiscal 
allocation between central and provincial governments, and its effects to disparities in 
Indonesia during 1993-2005. Although this research follows many previous studies in the 
field, the research are based on Indonesia fiscal decentralisation, which are uniquely and 
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distinguished from other countries practice. In addition, it also should be noted that since 
Indonesia decentralisation is at the municipality/regency level, this study should be a first 
stage to understand the fiscal decentralisation effect to the disparities among regions in 
Indonesia.  
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 we will overview decentralisation and fiscal 
reforms in Indonesia, and a brief theory on convergence and disparity. Section 3 discusses 
will test the impact of fiscal decentralisation to inequalities among provincial development 
using panel data and section 4 report the conclusion of this study.  
 
2 Indonesian Decentralisation  
2.1 Indonesia Decentralisation  
After financial crisis took effect in 1997, Indonesian politics changes from stable 
authoritarian regime to constantly under attack from many sectors of societies, which 
eventually pushed democratic reform (Seymour et al, 2002). The movement caused violent 
and peaked with the end of the “New Order” regime. Following the financial crisis and 
political changes, Indonesia begins its decentralisation era. The “Reform” regime starts with 
region autonomy through the Law No 22/1999 concerning decentralisation, granting regional 
autonomy and Law No 25/1999 concerning fiscal administration between centre and regional 
governments.  
According to the literature, there are two types of decentralisation, the de-concentration 
and devolution administration (Rondinelli, 1990). De-concentration is known as the division 
of power central government to its local organization. It can be viewed, that in association 
with organizing principles, de-concentration is a bureaucratic and administrative 
decentralisation. This type of decentralisation forms in field and regional administrative 
offices and usually in a specific government function. On the other hand, decentralisation is a 
process of democratic and political decentralisation, administrative by local and regional 
governments. It is also know as the devolution of power.  It can be seen that, while de-
concentration only delegates power of administration from central government to local 
authority, devolution transfers the administrative and political power to local governments 
(autonomous regions).  
Decentralisation are divided into four types, which are (i) de-concentration in which only 
administrative that are given to the region, but political decision and law are produced by the 
central government. Until 1997, Indonesia applied to this type of decentralisation. (ii) 
delegation to autonomous organization in which central government delegate power to 
organization on a particular subject, then (iii) central government transfers power to the non-
governmental organization, which are in a particular time period and on a specific case. Last, 
(iv), devolution in which was form to strengthen independent level of region government to 
manage its region with no overlapping function, that if combine with central government will 
form total government administration.  
In Indonesia, decentralisation is formed in three levels, provincial, municipality/regency, 
and village. Municipality and regency are at the same government administration level, a 
level between the provincial government and village administrator. The difference between 
the two is that municipality is dominated with urban activities, including manufacturing, trade, 
service, and hospitality, meanwhile regency economic activities are driven by more rural-
based sectors, such as agriculture and agro-business (Nurcholis, 2005).  
According to the decentralisation Law 22/1999, decentralisation at the provincial level is 
in the de-concentration and devolution form, on the other hand, municipality/regency and 
village operates in the devolution form. While provincial decentralisation is considered as 
“the extended arm” of Central government, municipalities/regencies administration are in 
complete control of their region. In other words, provincial government are both de-
concentration and devolution, while municipality/regency governments are in devolution form. 
Decentralisation excludes several sensitive sectors as central government’s responsibility 
(Chandra, 2008). Such sensitive sectors are foreign policies, national security and defence, 
national finance, law, religion, macro economy policies and macro politic policy. Regions are 
permitted to all local government function such as transportation, health, local economics, and 
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other local region specific sectors. The law also stated that regions could form cooperation 
with other organisation in a foreign country, both public and private owned. Regional 
governments through domestic and international cooperation should utilize these 
opportunities.  
Islam (1999) argued that the result of the level of decentralisation is a significance 
disparity, both among provinces and municipality/regency. In his example, effective and 
decent administration within a region will lead a region to earn large share of provincial fund 
and left other regions to compete for the remaining fund. Furthermore, he claims that the law 
may also encourage inefficient development, with two or more neighbouring regions could 
develop the same infrastructure. Not only overlapping services, this decentralisation may also 
limits people from one region to lose public service from another region (Islam, 1999). While 
may not too emerge in the provincial level, in municipal/regency level the increasing “region-
ego” with favouring “putra daerah”/native people to work in local government and run 
political positions seems to be more visible. 
According to Law 22/1999, decentralisation government leaders are elected through 
political election, and at the provincial level it is govern by a governor and at the 
municipal/regency level is mayor/head of regency. The municipal/regency government are 
also responsible to decide political decision such as government acts, regulations, and 
responsible in implementation. The functional office is an autonomous and under the 
municipal/regency government. While the provincial government besides administrate its own 
provincial governments, it also coordinates the central government’s agencies in the province, 
such as in the field of administration office in education, religion, transport administration, etc. 
 
2.2 Fiscal Decentralisation  
This section will discuss briefly on central government role before decentralisation. 
Indonesia central government spending has two categories, routine spending and development 
spending. Routine budgets are consisted of expenditures on wage and asset maintenance, 
meanwhile development budget compromise of government spending on development related 
expenditures such as construction of infrastructure and other capital expenditures. Despite its 
significant role as a direct influence on present and future level of public service and 
important role in economic activities, development budget shares only 20% of total central 
government budget and 35% of sub-national expenditure. Before the decentralisation, 
Indonesia had the highest government expenditure in 1980/1981 at 24% of the GDP, due to 
the high revenue from the oil export. The condition change when Indonesia was hit by the oil 
price shock that effect the government to borrow foreign fund and aid. It leads to non-oil 
manufacturing reform tax in the 1980s. Eventually, Indonesia had rapid revenue increase form 
the non-oil industries sectors.  In just five years, revenue ratio of non oil sectors to GDP rise 
from 10% in 1989 to 14% in 1995 while the revenue from oil continue to decrease to 26% in 
1999.  
At the peak of the second oil shock, I 1980/1981,total government expenditure around 
24% of GDP, which was the highest percentage in Indonesian history (Booth 2005). The 
expenditure shares of GDP decline in the end of 1980s to 8% and increase again up to 16% in 
1990s. Moreover, during 1980-2000, private investment share grew from 50% to 73%. The 
figure fell to 12 % in 1983 and 8% in 1989. This fall has increases the national debt to foreign 
charge to 7% of GDP in 1988/1989 from foreign aid and borrowing, although it fell after 
1990. During the crisis, Indonesia GDP growth decline from 13.1% in 1998 to 4.9% in 2000. 
Almost 50% of government expenditure was allocated for interest payments, especially for 
petroleum subsidies and bailout of system (Kuncoro, 2007). This increased the foreign debt 
banking, and liability and development expenditure drop to under 3% in 2000, compared 
5.5% in 1994 (Tambunan, 2006).  
After the financial crisis, Indonesia expenditure varies, both in government scale and 
classification. In 2001, education and culture has the highest share in central spending at US$ 
9.914 million and at the sub-national level is dominated by trade and transport with 25.5% 
share of total.  In the same year, overall central government spending shares 41% in regions 
and increase up to 72% in 2005. In the sub-national level, trade and transport sector share 
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one-third of total development spending by both district and provinces. In addition, district 
level government focuses on regional development and environment with almost 20%, while 
province spends 25 % of its budget for state apparatus and control. This shows the difference 
of main focus of each sub-national level in accordance to the decentralisation law. Based on 
public spending equity, the uneven of total amount spent in province level is the highest, 
followed by district and national level in 2001. This could also be one of the evidence that 
supports decentralisation should be at the district than at the province. Table 1 describes 
government’s expenditure classification.  
Indonesia has been a highly decentralised country only in three years since the law 
implemented (Table 2) (Brodjonegoro, 2003). In Law 25/1999 and its revised comparison 
summary (Table 3), it can be seen that the decentralisation has offer more proportional share. 
The proportional share between the governments (central, province, and 
municipalities/regency) is based on each region’s revenue they generate and also allow them 
to generate their own revenue (Seymour, 2002). In the first law, Provinces and Municipalities 
endowed with natural resources gain more revenue than other regions (70-80%) and the share 
increases 0.5% in the revised law. In addition, in the decentralisation law, revenue proportion 
also occurs in economic activities. The larger economic activity regions gains more revenue 
compared with others, but this tax remains the same in the revised law. It can be seen that in 
the long term, decentralisation will cause disparities between rich and poor regions more 
significant. 
Disparities in Indonesia have been severe compared with other countries, especially since 
the financial crisis in 1997. The decentralisation of regional government itself recently has 
been viewed to increased the disparities, rather than decrease it (Aritenang, 2008). In order to 
improve that, a new decentralisation Law in 2004, which replace the decentralisation act 1999, 
states that municipal/regency where the natural resources located, earn higher revenue share 
compared with the province government and other municipalities/regencies in the same 
province. This attracts debates since on one hand, it is acceptable due to the fact that the 
region has to develop its area based on local resources, and on the other hand, with higher 
revenue share, prosperous regions will have faster economic growth. In addition, not only 
increases disparities between municipalities/regencies, larger revenue share will allows 
provincial government to build infrastructure cross municipality/regency, that will benefit the 
municipality/regency within the province and rise disparities with other provinces. 
 
Table 1 
Government Expenditure Sector Classification 
No Sector 
1 Primary 
2 Secondary 
3 Trade and Transportation 
4 Education and Culture 
5 Health and Welfare 
6 Regional Development and Environment 
7 State Apparatus and Control 
Source: Brodjonegoro, 2003, BPS, Author’s calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
Table 2 
Local Expenditure in Indonesia, 2001-2005 
 2001 2002  2003  2004  2005  
Local Expenditure/ Central Expenditure 35.8 47.19 37.73 42.34 41.93 
Local Expenditure/GDP 6.14 7.07 4.93 7.82 8.6 
Local Development Budget / Central 
Development Budget 72.28 19.36 10.02 14.25  5.22 
Source: Brodjonegoro, 2003, BPS, Author’s calculation 
 
Table 3 
Comparison Balance Fund: Level of transfer of fund between Central and Regional 
Governments under Law 25/1999 and its revised in 2002  
Revenue Source Law 25/1999 Revised Law 2002 
Central Government 
proportion (%) 
Local 
Government 
proportion within 
Province     (%) 
Central 
Government 
proportion (%) 
Provincial 
Government (%) 
Municipality/Reg
ency Government            
(%) 
Other 
Municipality/Reg
ency in the same 
Province (%) 
Central 
Government 
proportion (%) 
Natural Resources 20 80 20 16 32 32 
Oil mining 85 15 84.5 3.1 6.2 6.2 
Gas 70 30 69.5 6.1 12.2 12.2 
Income Tax 80 20 80 8 12 - 
Company Tax 100 0 100 0 0 0 
Land and property tax 10 90 10 16.2 64.8 - 
Acquisition of land and 
building rights 20 80 20 16 64 - 
Source: Brodjonegoro, 2003, BPS, Author’s calculation 
 
2.3 Critiques for Indonesian Devolution 
This subsection will introduce a brief critiques and discussion that may shed light 
furthermore on Indonesia devolution. The first critique is the level of autonomy is at the 
municipality/regency level, rather than the provincial level. The critique were on the fact that 
the provincial should have more capacities on human capital, administration capabilities and 
other resources than the lower level government. But the decision become understandable if 
we consider this was to prevent province, with its large size and resource, to be too powerful 
in terms of political and financial power, which then may jeopardize Indonesian unity. This 
also to prevents the possibility of excessive control by the provincial government over some 
strategic industries and natural resources. The official reason is that to be able the 
municipality/regency government be closer to their voters and people (Seymour et al, 2002). 
Islam (1999) argues that this devolution will be controllable for the central government to 
handle small and numerous municipalities/regencies than a few large provinces. He also 
analyzed that devolution will cause greater disparities, because efficient provinces and 
municipalities/regencies will earn larger share than others. In addition, it will lead to 
inefficient development with cases that municipalities/regencies will build their own facilities 
and hence oversupply of infrastructure may become one of the effects of the devolution.  
Second critique, related with the human capital capacities, numerous papers argues that 
municipalities/regencies officers are not ready for the devolution (Seymour et al, 2002). The 
authors are supported by SMERU research, in which stress that level of education and 
management capabilities, at both executive (government) and representative assembly (local 
parliament) are weak and has not function as an accountable and transparent bodies (Seymour 
et al, 2002). Third, it is also critiqued that the type of the intergovernmental transfer in a form 
of DAU (CAF) are still favoured regions with rich natural resources, as can be seen form the 
balance funding sharing scheme. The specific regulation of DAU that ensure regions fiscal 
transfer will not decrease on the following years, will also worsen the situation. The policy on 
CAF that is “hold harmless” that ensures regions CAF allocation for current year may not be 
less, in nominal terms, than the previous year, has made inequality further. Beside that, 
revenue of own source revenue (OSR) is also uneven with a comparison of the highest and 
lowest achiever at 510 between districts and 47 between provinces in 2002. This will impact 
further disparities, with rich regions are more funded and poor regions share become lessen. 
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2.4 Fiscal Status 
Government spending in Indonesia can be divided into two types: routine expenditure and 
development expenditure. Figure 1 shows budgetary spending for both central and provincial 
government to GDP. The figure shows the changes budgetary expenditure between 1993 and 
2005, in which government expenditure rose from 17.8% to 31.9%. Continually, government 
expenditure ratio to GDP always increased except for the sharp declined during the financial 
crisis. The ratio during the crisis fell from 28.5% in 1998 to 15.1% in 1999, before it 
increased steadily again. Currently, there is an upward trend on the ratio indicating that 
government expenditure is peaked.  
 
Figure 1 
Expenditure Share to GDP (%) 
1993-2005 
 
Source: BPS, Author’s calculation 
Figure 2 
Revenue Share to GDP (%) 
1993-2005 
 
Source: BPS, Author’s calculation 
 
2.5 Relative between central and provincial fiscal (800) 
Literature in this field suggested that fiscal decentralisation is measured as a ratio of local 
government’s spending and revenue to central government’s spending and revenue collection 
(Zhang et al, 1998). However, this is not the case for Indonesia fiscal arrangement before the 
financial decentralisation. Before 2001, local government collected revenue locally, but it was 
not spent locally rather it was levied by central government. After the decentralisation, local 
government was able to collect locally and only a certain amount was remit to the central 
government. As can be seen from Figure 4, provincial expenditure only accounted for 
between 0.2% to 3.3% on the ratio between total government spending and GDP. Moreover, 
the share also decreases during the financial crisis from 3.3% in 1998 to 0.5% in 1999. The 
present ratio increase also occurs in the provincial share, although it has not peaked the rate in 
1998.  
In addition, provincial government spending was 2.02% of GDP and account for 10.2% 
of total government expenditure in 1993. These shares become 2.8% and 8.9% in 2005, 
respectively. These do not indicate significant progress in the fiscal decentralisation during 
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the study time range. However, if it is analyze after the decentralisation Law, it has a rapid 
fiscal devolution with 3.4% in 1999 and increase to 9.5% in 2003. 
2.6 Convergence Concept 
Convergence concept is a concept that explores to define economic performance cross 
countries/regions, in order to view whether economic convergence has occurred. The first 
method is the α convergence and second is the β convergence. First, α convergence refers as 
a decline in variation of income per capita within a country/region over time, which αt+1 < αt, 
where α is the standard deviation of income per capita. On the other hand, β convergence 
relates with the sign in which a relationship between growth income per capita and its initial 
level. If negative relationship occurs, then it can be explain that poor regions experience faster 
growth than rich economic regions and hence, there are convergence over time within the 
country (Barro et al, 1995).  
The basic equation for a region N with annual data that are available for per capita 
income is approximated by:  
! 
ln(Y
it
) =" + (1#$)ln(Y
it#1) + %i  
(1) 
Dependent variable is the Yit, the GDP per capita growth, as the net log of per capita 
income, α and β are constant, with 0 < β < 1 and ε is the disturbance term. The term β > 0 
refers that β convergence because annual rate is inversely related to (Yit-1) and higher value of 
β shows higher degree of convergence. Theoretically, β convergence is a necessary condition 
for α convergence to exist, but it is not sufficient to ensure the occurrence of α convergence. 
This is because it may rise of fall towards steady state depending on the initial value.  
 
3 Empirical Estimation  
3.1 Variables and estimation  
The data are mainly gathered from Indonesia Bureau of Statistics (BPS) and Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). Data from the BPS are available through the Annual Statistical year book 
and other unpublished resources, meanwhile the data on fiscal decentralisation are obtain 
from the MOF website in the national and regional budget history data. This research uses the 
provincial data for 26 provinces for its analysis convenient – after disintegration of East 
Timor in 1998 and before decentralisation in 1999- and due to data availability, this research 
are studied in the period 1993-2005, in Indonesian Rupiah currency.  
This research will use the panel data analysis to estimate the impact of independent 
variables to the dependent variable and utilize the econometric regression in fixed-effect to 
control individual differences between provinces that do not varies across period (Jennifer, 
2008). As been described, all disparity level is measured using the convergence concept by 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991). The absolute convergence equation (2) implies that the 
economic growth, denoted by GDP per capita ΔYit, is determined by α convergence and β 
convergence. 
Meanwhile, the conditional convergence is absolute convergence added with explanatory 
variables. In this study, the explanatory variables consist of three types data, which are Iit is 
vector of time-varying control variables, Zit a vector of fiscal decentralisation variables, and 
Dit is a vector of distance variables.  
 
ΔYit= α – βYit-1 
(2) 
ΔYit=α – βYit-1 + α2ΔIit+α3ΔZit+α4ΔDit + ε 
(3) 
 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of income per capita growth in each 
province for the period, using per capita GDP. The determinant of disparity index is noted as 
the initial GDP per capita, as LAG. This variable sign indicates the occurrence of 
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convergence development among provinces. The negative sign explains that convergence 
economic growth is taking place in the economy. This research uses inequality variable (Iit) in 
a form of physical capital as in Rivas (2007), an approximate for this variable is using the 
value of approved foreign direct investment in each province, CAPITAL. This data shows the 
total foreign capital and the impacts it has on the provincial growth. This variable is expected 
to have a positive significant sign indicating high level of capital in a certain province will 
increase economic growth. 
 Additional variable included in this research is the logged population growth, 
POPGROW, used to control large population between provinces (Logan, 2008). In addition, 
educational rates, HC, are included to overview the difference of human capacities between 
provinces. The data are collected as the ratio of high school students to total population within 
the province. This approach is used because high school graduates could be regarded as a high 
skill worker, considering the nation’s minimum compulsion education is junior high school. 
This variable is expected to have a positive relationship with economic growth.   
The fiscal decentralisation (Zit) variable data are can be located from the MoF website in 
the budget history section. The first variable is the growth of ratio between local revenue and 
CAF revenue, FISCAP. Low ratio means that the province is heavily dependent on central 
government transfer fund. This variable is expected to have a positive sign because higher 
ratio explains that provinces are autonomous and self-sufficient, leading to higher economic 
development across provinces. Other fiscal decentralisation variables are the ratio of 
provincial fiscal to central revenue and expenditure, referred as REVDES and EXPDES.   
To gain more specific explanation, this paper uses the ratio of routine and development 
expenditures to GDP in each province, these variables are considered to increase during the 
decentralisation compared before, ADMIN and DVLP respectively. I used the ratio to get the 
expenditure value relative to provincial GDP, rather than expenditure per se. Using this ratio 
we can view the effect of the expenditure to economic growth, regardless its nominal value. 
The routine expenditure includes expenditure on government officer wages and training, and 
government service expense. Another fiscal decentralisation is the ratio of provincial and 
central share in revenue from oil and gas industry, OILGAS. This variable indicates the effect 
of changes in revenue sharing between provincial and central government. Unfortunately, 
there are no data on tax revenue included in the fiscal decentralisation besides natural 
resources tax revenue (income, company and land tax) for each provincial as in Table 3. The 
data are included in the individual provincial whole revenue data as above. This limits the 
capacity of this paper to explain the impact of changes in fiscal decentralisation to disparities 
among Indonesian provinces.  
The last explanation variable is the distance variable (Dit) that constructs interaction term 
to estimate location effect in different time period. The distance is calculate in kilometre, km, 
from each province capital city to the Indonesia’s capital city, Jakarta, as where the central for 
government and economic activities. This distance is gathered from website 
www.mapcrow.info, which use each city’s spatial information on latitude and longitude 
measurement as a reference to calculate the distance between cities. Afterwards, the study 
uses interaction term between the distance and variable on the ratio between local revenue and 
intergovernmental transfer (CAF), as DIST. This interaction term inform possible correlation 
between distance and fiscal decentralisation to economic growth. The author expects to 
observe positive and significant link between a provinces distance to the capital city due to 
larger economic spillovers and intergovernmental relationship.  
 
3.2 Regression result 
3.2.1 Absolute Convergence  
The first analysis is the absolute convergence to overview the general convergence 
process among Indonesia provinces. The result is reported at table 3 for several analyses. 
Column (1) in Table 3 implies that there are a significant convergence in Indonesia provinces 
during 1993 – 2005 at a rate of 0.32 explaining that with 99 per cent of confidence, it is 
argued that poor provinces growth rate is higher than provinces with higher initial GDP level 
at a rate of 32% annually. However, if we look based on time-event, the convergence among 
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province before the financial crisis in 1993-1998 had a significant and higher speed rate at 68 
per cent annually. As for after the financial crisis between 1998 – 2005, negative sign 
showing that converging is still is progress with a rate at 9.6 per cent and insignificant. In 
addition, column 4 shows that since the implementation of decentralisation in 2001, the 
convergence rate has slightly increase to 11 per cent.  
The regression could only explain by 5.3% of variance of economic growth with 338 
observations through 13 years sample period. In addition, the regression could explain more 
variance in the years before decentralisation between 1993-1998 than after the 
implementation of devolution at 12%. This shows that after decentralisation, provincial 
economic growth is determined by more factors beside its initial GDP per capita. This is a 
prove that policy and law changes during the decentralisation has impacted provincial growth, 
such policies that may took place are decentralisation and fiscal decentralisation, Indonesia’s 
commitment to numerous free trade agreements, and social characteristics such as human 
capital and population growth.  
 
Table 4 
Absolute Convergence in Various Periods 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  1993 - 2005  1993 - 1998  1998 - 2001  2002 - 2005 
Yit-1  -0.3174***  -0.683***  -0.103  -0.117 
  (-4.45)  (-3.88)  (-1.23)  (-1.25) 
         
Adj R2  0.0528  0.1199  0.005  0.0055 
Obs  338  230  104  104 
*, **, and *** are 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent significance, respectively 
 
3.2.2 Base Case  
Our base regression uses the inequality variable and the decentralisation variable as 
conditional convergence regression. As can be seen in Table 5, during the whole study period 
convergence consistently occurs but with different speed rate based on the specific event that 
follows, with higher convergence rate compared with the absolute regression. The results in 
the table suggest an interesting finding because it reports different impact of fiscal 
decentralisation sector and time-event effects to disparities. Furthermore, this subsection aims 
to analysis the effect of financial decentralisation, also its Law revision in 2002, to provincial 
disparities. 
Results in table 5 are divided into four time frame, which are the whole period analysis, 
before the financial crisis, after decentralisation and after the revision of the decentralisation 
politically and fiscal regulation. This division is applied to overview the impact of variables 
on throughout the period. In the entire period analysis, Indonesia provinces are experiencing 
economic convergence and economic growth, despite financial crisis that occurs more than a 
decade ago. This convergence growth explains that there are tendencies that poor provinces 
have higher growth rate than advance provinces.  
As shown in column (1), throughout the study period, the base regression variables are 
mainly significant at 1 % and the finding explains almost 27% of the sample variance. But 
this analysis is not accurate because during the period, there was an important event, causes 
by financial crisis 1997, which lead Indonesia to political and fiscal devolution in 1999. For 
the entire period, population growth is a significant burden to discourage economic growth 
economic growth, shown with negative sign. An increase of 1 % in population growth will 
decrease economic growth 7.508 % before decentralisation and more than 8 % after 
decentralisation. In other words, population growth effect does not vary before and during the 
decentralisation. 
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Table 5 
Basic Conditional Convergence in Various Periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1993-2005 1993-1998 1999-2005 2001-2005 
LAG 
-0.74*** 
(-6.20) 
 
-0.922*** 
(-5.83) 
 
-.0201** 
(-3.00) 
 
-0.133 
(-1.64) 
 
POPGROW 
-10.21*** 
(-7.50) 
 
-7.508 ** 
(-2.92) 
 
-8.54 *** 
(-5.84) 
 
-7.57*** 
(-4.99) 
 
OILGAS 
15.42*** 
(3.91) 
 
1.77** 
(3.22) 
 
0.5708* 
(2.53) 
 
0.181 
(-0.66) 
 
CAPITAL 
 
-12.5*** 
(-3.55) 
 
-129.1** 
(-3.75) 
 
-18.89*** 
(-3.72) 
 
-12.11* 
(-2.23) 
 
EXPDES 
 
1.12*** 
(4.28) 
 
8.008 
(0.37) 
 
14.46*** 
(-5.30) 
 
11.96 
(1.64) 
 
REVDES 
-31.34*** 
(-4.42) 
 
0.450 
(0.05) 
 
15.51*** 
(4.84) 
 
-12.38 
(-1.6) 
 
     
Adj R2 0.2696 0.3384 0.2570 0.1819 
Obs 338 130 208 130 
*, **, and *** are 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent significance, respectively 
 
We start the temporal analysis with column (2) that explains results for development 
before decentralisation. With higher R square at 34%, the findings in this period explains 
more than in other period. Before decentralisation, the amount of fixed capital within the 
province and oil and gas revenue share determines economic growth, holding other variables 
constant. Column (3) confirms that this is not the case for after decentralisation, besides 
capital and oil and gas revenue share, both provincial expenditure and revenue share has 
significant influence on economic growth, denoted with EXPDES and REVDES. It can be 
seen from the comparison between columns (3) and (4) that fiscal share is important during 
the decentralisation. It is expected that provinces with higher share in expenditure and 
revenue will gain higher economic growth after 1999.  
Column (4) shows the findings for regression after the implementation of the new fiscal 
Law. This regression finding does not explain the period variation as in the previous 
regression because it has lower R square. In this last regression, the fiscal decentralisation 
variables do not have significant effect to economic growth and even, the share provincial 
revenue may discourage economic growth.  
  
3.2.3 Alternative Measurement 
Table 6 reports the result of the conditional convergence using both ordinary least square 
(OLS) and panel data analysis fixed effect (FE) to estimate equation (1) in column (1) and (2). 
Following Resosudarmo and Vidyattama (2006), for the panel data analysis we use random 
effects to avoid inconsistency. The method also uses Haussman test to demonstrate that there 
is significance difference in fixed effect estimation with OLS and random effects. The results 
shows that panel data with fixed-effect analysis the initial GDP per capita has higher effect 
than with the OLS regression. A 1% increase on initial GDP per capita level only effect 
convergence rate at 0.88% while in the panel regression the convergence increase between 
3.13% and 4.7%. This finding also confirms the previous section that initial GDP per capita 
influence more to economic growth before the decentralisation than after.  
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Table 6 
Alternative Conditional Convergence in Various Periods 
 (1) OLS 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
 1993-2005 1993-2005 1993 – 1998 1999 - 2005 
LAG 
 
-0.876 *** 
(-8.18) 
 
-3.35*** 
(-24.26) 
-4.7*** 
(-21.37) 
-3.13*** 
(-8.07) 
 
POPGROW 
 
-0.188 ** 
(-3.3) 
 
-0.04 
(-1.04) 
-0.87 
(-.086) 
-0.075* 
(-2.61) 
OILGAS 
 
1.77*** 
(5.6) 
 
5.84*** 
(6.97) 
9.91*** 
(3.72) 
4.11*** 
(4.37) 
CAPITAL 
 
--42.31 
(-1.89) 
 
-45.3** 
(-1.04) 
-74.3 
(-0.7) 
-7.27 
(-0.72) 
HC 
 
-27.79 *** 
(-5.00) 
 
--34.5*** 
(-8.69) 
 
-45.78 
(0.91) 
-36.1*** 
(-14.75) 
DIST 
 
0.00013 
(1.32) 
 
0.00042*** 
(3.79) 
0.002*** 
(3.44) 
0.000267** 
(2.85) 
FISCAP 
 
0.207** 
(2.96) 
 
0.069 
(0.97) 
 
0.013 
(0.04) 
 
0.02 
0.35) 
 
REVDES 
 
25.29 
(1.57) 
 
6.15 
(0.6) 
-6,07 
(0.12) 
12.59 
(1.79) 
EXPDES 
 
18.46 
(1.02) 
 
40.05** 
(2.78) 
121.709* 
(2.49) 
-1.48 
(-0.1) 
ADMIN 4.2 (1.59) 
4.803** 
(2.78) 
-53.5** 
(-2.67) 
9.31*** 
(5.35) 
DVLP 13.02 (0.57) 
5.37 
(0.36) 
-136.9 
(-1.38) 
-6.0001 
(-0.6) 
     
     
Adj R2 0.3211 0.16 0.3101 0.3101 
Obs 338 338 146 182 
*, **, and *** are 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent significance, respectively 
 
A similar result was also found in the oil and gas revenue share. As results for all time 
period are positive and highly significant, the share from natural resources revenue has more 
impact before the implementation of the decentralisation law. Before decentralisation law in 
1999, holds other variable constant, an increase on oil and gas revenue share of 1 % may 
increase the economic growth to 9.91% and it decrease to only 4.11% after the 
decentralisation era. This result is evidence that the decentralisation on oil and gas would 
promote disparities between provinces.  Another interesting finding is the sign and 
significance of the human capital variable. In all column, human capital coefficient are 
negative and this could be interpreted that high school graduates tend to be a liable for the 
economic growth due to their low job rate employment. This suggest that Indonesia needs to 
established high schools that prepares specific skills for those who will not go for further 
education, such as vocational school in Europe. Human capital is significant as a determinant 
of economic growth during the decentralisation than before. This could be interpreted that, to 
achieve higher economic growth, the quality of human resources in Indonesia are more 
important now than ever and we should have more ratio of population in the higher education 
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than high school. Further more, this variable also shows that larger difference rate on human 
capital annually will increase inequality between provinces, in terms of the disparity between 
regions.  
The DIST variable result indicate that the distance from capital city, Jakarta, may 
influence the impact of FISCAP variable to the provincial disparities. The variable occurs to 
be positive and significant for all regression, shows that, ceteris paribus, the further the 
distance from the capital city, Jakarta, the higher the effect of FISCAP variable to increase 
economic growth. In other words, FISCAP variable may not have significant impact to 
increase economic growth in provinces near Jakarta. The result shows that the interaction 
term had more effect before the decentralisation than after the new law implemented. In all 
regression, the ratio of local revenue and intergovernmental-transfer, FISCAP, remains not 
significant and has a very low impact on economic growth. This result proofs that central 
government’s role on providing the accurate intergovernmental-transfer amount has more 
effect during the devolution than before.  
The whole period analysis shows that the expenditure and revenue share of provincial 
government has different effect between the periods. Provincial expenditure has negative 
effect before decentralisation and supports economic growth afterwards. On the other hand, 
provincial revenue is highly significant encourages economic growth during the new regime 
and it become a burden during decentralisation era. On the other hand, the share of 
administration expenditure, ADMIN, has become highly significant to enhance economic 
growth in the decentralisation era than in the new regime. We can see this in reality as skilful 
bureaucrats and efficient public service will create effective local government. This is also 
assisted by Indonesia government’s commitment to establish clean government and 
corruption free administration.  
 
3.2.4 Impact of financial decentralisation variables 
The last analyses set is the impact of fiscal decentralisation variables alone to the 
economic growth in Table 7. It can be analyze that decentralisation promote convergence in 
Indonesia province development as all LAG variable are negative and significant. The column 
(1) describes the effect if all decentralisation variables are included. All variable are 
significant, except the EXPDES variable. The result in column (1) suggested that the share of 
revenue in natural resources and local revenue growth determines the economic growth 
significantly at a confidence of 99%. Moreover, the share of provincial revenue to central 
revenue and provincial expenditure will influence the economic growth at different direction. 
Higher provincial revenue will create more capital for province to develop, thus the variable 
has a significant positive effect to economic growth. In addition, an unexpected result is found 
in the impact of provincial development budget ratio to GDP. This could be explain that with 
higher development expenditure may increase development for a certain provinces and 
eventually this will encourage disparities between provinces. This condition will be a problem 
for the whole national economic growth.  
Column (2) in Table 7 sets to omit fiscal expenditure sectors. The result is that the 
convergence speed has been depressed from 3.2% to 3.12%. This shows the significant 
influence of the variable to economic growth. In addition, provincial revenue share and fiscal 
capacity effect has decrease with the exclusion of these variables. On the other hand, the 
impact of provincial oil and gas revenue share increase in 1% will increase the economic 
growth by 6.2%, if there were no expenditure on administration and development. Column (3) 
explores the regression if the provincial expenditure ratio to central expenditure is excluded. 
In the two previous regressions, the EXPDES remain insignificant with different signs, 
however this variable is important since omitting this variable the regression could only 
explain variance in the sample by 11.61% compared with 13.07% when EXPDES is included. 
Furthermore, excluding this variable also decreased the effect shares of oil and gas, provincial 
revenue, and fiscal capacity.  
Overall, this last regression shows that financial decentralisation has a significant role to 
promote convergence development in Indonesia. The oil and gas revenue share, fiscal 
capacities and provincial revenue are among the significant variables to sustain economic 
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growth in Indonesia. Together with strengthening human capital in the ADMIN variable, 
provincial government should raise the above revenues to ensure sustainable economic 
growth and discourage disparities among provinces.  
 
 
 
Table 7 
Financial Decentralisation Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LAG -3.2 *** (-22.4) 
-3.12 *** 
(-21.78) 
-3.12 *** 
 (-21.83) 
OILGAS 5.67***  (6.04) 
6.2*** 
 (6.46) 
5.63*** 
(5.88) 
FISCAP 0.23***  (3.85) 
0.23*** 
 (3.82) 
0.15 ***  
(2.63) 
ADMIN 3.77 * (2.42)  
4.64 ** 
(2.95) 
DVLP -23.38***  (-3.90)  
-18.2** 
 (-3.07) 
EXPDES -0.52 (-0.05) 
47.63 
 (0.55)  
REVDES 56.48***  (3.61) 
47.442** 
(3.09) 
23.65* 
 (2.48) 
    
Adj R2 0.139 0.1307 0.1161 
Obs 338 338 338 
*, **, and *** are 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent significance, respectively 
 
4 Conclusion  
In this paper we have viewed several variables that determine economic growth and 
development convergence among provinces in Indonesia. Indonesia decentralisation law in 
1999 has changed the fiscal arrangement between central and local government completely, 
with local government has autonomous responsibilities to organize its expenditure based on 
new revenue sharing scheme. Although the full decentralisation is on the 
municipality/regency level, nevertheless this paper could give brief insight on the current 
situation of a fiscal decentralisation and how it effect development convergence in Indonesia.  
From the findings we can sum up that Indonesia development are still heading 
convergence growth, with poor province have more rapid economic growth than rich 
countries. However, the speed of convergence has been depressed by the financial crisis in 
1997 and it has not shift during the decentralisation. The fiscal decentralisation variables are 
significant attribute to gain economic growth and convergence. All our fiscal decentralisation 
variables positively effect, except the DVLP variable. The OILGAS, FISCAP, and ADMIN 
variables are the most influential variables to achieve effective growth.  
On the other hand, provincial expenditure on development is regarded unnecessary, as it 
is more for municipality/regencies expenditure. In addition, other determinant of growth 
includes variables such as revenue shares from population growth and human capitals are 
crucial local based characteristics that determine provincial growth. This is especially during 
decentralisation era, in which local government are responsible to develop territorial 
autonomously and manage these local resources to sustain and enhance its provincial 
economic growth. Hence, higher expenditure on public administration, including local 
government wage, training, and improving public service, should be considered to provide 
effective governance in the sub-national level government.  
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